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FOREWORD
With this issue, the Marquette Law Review begins the sixth
year of its existence. On its merits it has gained the good will
of a large measure of the bench and bar. Now, as ever, it aims
to further extend its usefulness. To make itself indispensable
to every judge, to every lawyer is the aim of the editorial board.
To enable it to do this it invites the coSperation of the bench and
bar.

STATUTORY ENACTMENTS
The legislature of Wisconsin is still in session. Some four
hundred bills have been introduced in the Assembly, and over
three hundred in the senate. A great many of these will become
laws, to regulate the order of conduct of the citizens of the state.
A great many new laws will be added to the statute books. And
a great many more decisions will be necessary to eventually construe the laws. The practicing attorney knows that nearly every
new enactment requires judicial construction before its meaning
becomes definitely fixed. He has learned, that a necessary element
of every statute is the annotation. In a sense the new statute is
a mere expression of legislative intention, susceptible to addition
or subtraction by the Supreme Court, certainly to clarification.
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If, then, each statute requires juridical interpretation, does codification reduce the mass of the common "law? Does not, asks
the conservative lawyer, codification defeat the purposes intended
by its promoters, and by necessitating judicial construction, rather
increase the case law? That, it must be admitted, is actually its
effect. Our Supreme Court alone annually 'writes nearly three
volumes of opinions, the larger percentage of which involve a
judicial construction of statutes.
•Lawyers are inherently conservative, and often blindly reverent
to the past. Our Supreme court had a long difficulty adapting itself to the Code of Civil Procedure. So reverently did it cling to
the common law that nearly fifty years of Code practice have not
entirely effaced the exemplifications of that reverence. But the
lawyer's reverence for the Common Law is sound. He knows that
the law expressed in the cases is soundly reinforced by the wisdom
of centuries. Case law, he knows, is founded on reason, thorough
and voluminous. Moreover, he asks, if statutes require even more
voluminous determinations because more involved and hypertechnical, will codification cut down the output of case law?
No one is so foolhardy as to advocate an abolition of statutory
enactments. The modem world requires them. The marvellous
progress of the age is impatient, and new industry cannot await
slow developement of case law. Nor, perhaps, could case law as
effectively take care of simplified adjective law, though Common
Law states assert the contrary. But the maze of enactments of
legislatures at present, is the precise opposite of the congestion
Reason was controlling
prevailing under the Common Law.
under the old system; mere expediency is controlling the new.
The effect of the statute is too often not even conjectured under
modem legislative schemes. Worse, statutes are passed and added
to the books without any attempt at correlation so that one often
contradicts or merely reiterates another. Judges are always wary
of the effect of their decisions, ever insisting on harmony.
Perhaps it is this extreme conservatism, this determination to
be always right before announcing the law, that has made the
people impatient with courts. If the law is not fixed-business
risks will not be taken; business will not thrive. Hence predicted
certainty is attempted by legislative enactment. It, at least, expresses the legislative intent, binding in some degree on the courts.
Is the flood of statutory enactments justified? Ought legislation not, to some extent, curb itself? The proper legislation is
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truly a blessing when employed to correct an evil in the corpus
juris, or to provide for an exigency, but let it be less profusely
exercised. After all, both statutory and case law should be
identical, in adhering to the same immutable principles of justice,
of what is right and wrong. If new conditions arise, from new
industrial, social, or economic problems, let there be legislation
providing for the same. But if the occasion arise, let the statute
be most accurately framed; let its probable effect be most carefully considered. In this state there is a legislative library for the
use of the legislators to enable them to study the nature and
effect of bills. However, as long as the legislature is not made
up entirely of members who are experts in the law, the meaning
of enactments must be ever more or less indeterminate. The
suggestion that a commission be established to advise the legislature of the effect of a bill, is sound: The bill would then go
through a quasi-judicial determination before passage. Construction would precede the law. If such a committee could not
prevent overlegislation, it could keep it from becoming mischievous.
People clamor that the power of the court should be curbed;
that popular legislation be more respected by the courts. Evils
there may be in the courts, but they are not so great as those
arising from indiscriminate and voluminous legislation. Courts
ever attempt to be honest in declaring the common law. The
reason, the justice, remains the same, whether announced by an
elective court, or an elected political body. In the former case
there is a body of experts considering rules of conduct, guided by
the experience of centuries (precedent), by reason, and by a highly
developed sense of justice. In the latter, non-experts, untrained,
too frequently, aggregate the clauses of the statutes chiefly for
expediency.
Let the Legislature curb itself, or it will soon find itself hedged
between committees, like irresponsible schoolboys, one to pass on
whatever is to be enacted, and the other to see that it has been
dutifully performed. Let the legislature consume the session,
not in passing more bills, but in giving more consideration to those
that it does pass.
W. F. KUZENSKI, Editor-in-chief.

